Traveling the ridge routes and wadis between the smooth rolling Galilean countryside and the craggy hill country of central Israel, Yeshua (Jesus) and his disciples met and ministered to locals living in various villages. Along the Ascent of Adummim, the last leg up to Jerusalem, they encountered questioning countrymen, lonely lepers, and others isolated for multiple reasons.
These were the routes and terrains navigated by the Israelites in varying degrees of assemblage since Abraham was told to “go” some 4000 years ago. Now, Yeshua and those of the major Jewish “philosophies,” as Josephus (late first-century Jewish historian) prefers to call the Jewish sects, used these same routes, ministering throughout the land.
These sects held the land and the land covenant in common. Paul sums up Israelite commonalities in his letter to the Romans:
“My countrymen according to the flesh, who are Israelites, to whom pertain the adoption (cf. Exod. 4:22 LXX), the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law, the service of God, and the promises, of whom are the fathers and from whom, according to the flesh, Messiah came, who is over all, the eternally blessed God. Amen” (vv. 3b-5).
Their divergence, however, is in the Torah’s application. Nonetheless, they argued their points from the same Scriptures and used the same hermeneutic tools taught in the schools of Hillel and Shammai, the last zugot, or pairs. One rightly assumes that the extant narratives, which are codified for our historical and exegetical benefit, contain within them these tools of Jewish logic. If we can detect these ancient forms of reasoning, our interpretative process is all the more aided. Indeed, divisive doctrines like the doctrine of predestination, extrapolated from misunderstood forms of argumentation, miss the author’s intent and cast doubt as to God’s just character.
I want to address this tricky topic of predestination. Still, first, it is necessary to outline the forms of Jewish logic used by Yeshua and Paul to argue their biblical positions.1 Afterward, see if you can find these hidden forms, hidden by time and distance, to exegete challenging passages like a first-century sage; this will prove a fun and illuminating exercise! Resist the temptation to run to your nearest commentary.
Kal v’chomer (light and heavy):
Light to heavy matters are compared. It implies that whatever is true in a less critical matter also applies to a more important one. It often uses an “if … then how much more” formula.
Matthew 6:26: “If God cares for birds, how much more does he care for people?
Gezerah shawah (verbal analogy):
When the same word or phrase is used in two separate passages, the same considerations apply in both cases; what is known in one is applied to the other. Yeshua and Paul often used this rule as they argue their points before the leadership.
John 10:34 and Psalm 82:6 (image from my PowerPoint on this subject):
Binyan av mikathuv echad (constructing a family [Av] from a single text):
A word, phrase, or law found in one text pertains to all texts in the same topical family, generalizing the texts. They tend to use the same introductory formula.
Deuteronomy 17:2-7 begins, “If there is found among you … a man … a woman who …,” whose sin must be verified by more than one witness, then it is understood that any other case beginning with “If there is found among you … a man … a woman who,” also requires more than one witness.
Binyan av mi-shene kethuvim (Constructing a family from two texts):
A word, phrase, or law in two related texts can be generalized into a principle.
J. Julius Scott, Jr. demonstrates this Jewish form of logic by citing two verses from Exodus 21:26, 27: “If a man shall strike the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroy it, he shall set him free in return for his eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of his slave or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall set him free in return for his tooth.”
The principle established in these two related verses is that irreparable damage to a body part warrants freedom for the servant.
Kelal u-ferat u-ferat u-kelal (the general and the particular; the particular and the general: A general principle can be limited by the specific application of it in another text or visa versa, a specific rule can be generalized.
Leviticus 1:2 speaks generally of domestic animals but becomes specifically applied to a list of named animals in Exodus 22:10-11.
Ke-yotse bo be-maqom acher (A similarity in another passage): A difficulty in one passage may be solved by comparing it with another passage which has generally similar points.
My own studies applied this rule to Yeshua’s discussion with Pharisees who question the disciples on their grain-plucking on the Sabbath. Matthew 12:1-8 records this scene. Yeshua cites the similar scenario about David and his disciples eating the shewbread from 1 Samuel 21:1-6. He applies the ruling of David’s innocence to their own situation. Yeshua continues by noting that the priest serve in the Temple on Shabbat and are considered innocent of breaking the Sabbath.
Davar ha-lamedmeainyano (Something deduced from the context): Meaning is derived by understanding the context in which the verse appears.
This is a general rule of thumb when interpreting Scripture. For instance, the phrase used by Yeshua at the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount, “I have not come to abolish but to fulfill the Law and Prophets” (paraphrase, Matt. 5:17). This verse is often understood that since Yeshua fulfilled the Law and Prophets, they somehow are nullified. Yet, as one continues to read the chapter, the context clearly shows that Yeshua did not mean that at all.
I hope these rabbinic rules of interpretation are helpful when rooting out the logic behind challenging biblical debates between Yeshua or Paul and the local leadership. We should likewise use these same hermaneutics employed by the New Testament authors, bringing clarity to our theological perspectives.
Next time, we will apply these rules to discover an interesting interpretation about the doctrine of predestination.
Blessings—
All forms of middot (rules for interpretation) are from this same source, which includes not only R. Hillel’s seven rules listed above but also R. Ishmael’s thirteen (before 132 CE) and R. Eliezer’s thirty-two rules (after Bar Kockhba Revolt 135 CE). I have only included R. Hillel’s rules since he was an early contemporary of Yeshua.
J. Julius Scott Jr., Jewish Backgrounds of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 195), 130-131.